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THE BENEFITS OF BEING ECONOMICS 





Alphabetic name ordering on multi-authored academic papers, which is the convention in the 
economics discipline and various other disciplines, is to the advantage of people whose last 
name initials are placed early in the alphabet. As it turns out, Professor A, who has been a 
first author more often than Professor Z, will have published more articles and experienced a 
faster growth rate over the course of her career as a result of reputation and visibility. 
Moreover, authors know that name ordering matters and indeed take ordering seriously: 
Several characteristics of an author group composition determine the decision to deviate from 
the default alphabetic name order to a significant extent. 
JEL Code: A11, A14, J32, J44. 
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The performance measurement of individual academic output, i.e. research publications, has 
become a profession by itself. The resulting measures form the basis for academics’ salary 
increases, promotions, outside offers, and reputations (Moore et al, 2001). An explicit factor 
in these performance measurement systems is the number of co-authors on the paper.
2 
An implicit factor one believes to affect individual academic performance is the author’s 
rank in the author group of a multi-authored paper, even if the convention in the discipline is 
alphabetic name ordering as is the case in economics, the discipline we study. Approximately 
85% of multi-authored economics papers are observed to use alphabetic name ordering.
3  
First authorship would entail certain benefits and count heavier than second authorship. 
First, non-economists from disciplines that use merit based name ordering –to be defined 
precisely below- will perceive 'first authors' in economics journals as the authors with the 
highest contribution. Second, citation indices have for a long time only counted names of first 
authors. This implies an additional benefit attached to being the first author, since the number 
of citations is a common performance measure. Third, citations within articles, which clearly 
contribute to someone’s reputation and visibility, are shortened “first author et al.” as soon as 
there are more than two authors. Finally, visibility is also constrained for others than first 
authors in frequently used search engines such as Econlit: It merely reveals the name of the 
first author for articles with more than three authors.  
Hence, alphabetic name ordering would be to the disadvantage of authors whose names 
begin with a Z.
4 The first aim of this paper is to measure the magnitude of such an effect in 
the economics discipline.
5 And if the effect is sizable, do economists perceive name order 
selection for multi-authored papers as a deliberate choice?  
Basically two name ordering strategies can be used. The first is the alphabetic strategy, 
while the second is non-alphabetic. We assume that non-alphabetic name  ordering will 
typically be the result of uneven contributions, differences in hierarchical positions or in 
academic reputations between co-authors. We call the last ordering merit-based, where 




hierarchical positions) that lead to the group’s decision to use a non-alphabetic name ordering. 
We denote the alphabetic strategy by α, and the alternative byα .  
The outcome of 'merit-based' may be an alphabetical order as well. Looking at a sample of 
two-authored articles by A and B, it is obvious that if all authors followed α, we would find 
that the fraction of AB articles is 100%. In the other extreme case, in which all authors would 
follow the merit strategy, we would find a fraction of 50%, assuming independence between 
last names and merit. In practice, part of the AB- papers is the product of the merit-strategy, 
while the other part is a result of the alphabetic strategy. Let pα denote the chance that the 
alphabetic strategy is used. Then in the case of two authors, the chance of finding an 
alphabetical ordering P(AB) = pα + (1 - pα ) * 0.5. From the observed P(AB) we may assess 
the latent chance pα by 
(1)   pα = 2*P(AB)-1 
The chance P(AB) is the sum of the probabilities of using the alphabetic strategy and the 
probability of getting the alphabetic result, while embracing the merit strategy. Likewise, for 
n authors the relationship between the observed frequency of alphabetic name ordering and 
the frequency of following an alphabetic strategy is: 















The larger n, the smaller is the difference between the observed alphabetic fraction and the 
fraction of users of an alphabetic strategy.  
The second aim of the paper is to answer the question: What are the characteristics of the 
author group that influence their choice between name ordering strategies α or α ?  
Thus, our paper aims at making two contributions. First, the effect of alphabetic rank of an 
economist’s last name on individual productivity is measured. Second, we estimate the 
determinants of the (only partially observed) choice of author groups to deviate from an 
alphabetic name ordering strategy. The second analysis is novel. The first, i.e. measuring the 




using different measures of individual productivity and a more selected sample of 
economists.
6  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and how it was obtained. 
Section 3 deals with the effect of alphabetic name rank on individual academic output. 
Section 4 focuses on the determinants of following a merit strategy by author groups and 
thereby diverging from the alphabetic name ordering convention. Section 5 concludes that 
alphabetic name ordering is to the advantage of people whose last name initials are placed 
early in the alphabet. Moreover, authors know that name ordering matters and indeed take 
ordering seriously: Several characteristics of an author group composition determine the name 
order decision to a significant extent. 
 
II.  DATA 
The sample we collected consists of all regular articles published in the period 1997-1999 in 
11 mainstream economics journals. They are listed in Appendix Part A, where we also 
elaborate on the criteria used for selecting journals and articles. The resulting articles 
database consists of 2,311 articles. Table 1 shows that, consistent with Hudson’s findings, 
55% of these 2,311 are multi-authored leading to a database of 1,278 multi-authored articles 
(In Appendix Part A we comment on the variables included in this database). The vast 
majority of multi-authored papers, i.e. three quarter, is written by two authors, whereas 22 
percent is written by three authors. The percentage of articles written by more than three 
authors is smaller than four. The observed percentage of alphabetic name ordering in the 
entire set of multi-authored papers is 88%, translating, by means of (3) into a fraction using an 










Table 1 Frequency distribution of number of authors and name ordering over articles 
# authors  # articles  %  # authors   # alphabetic  P(AB)  (%)   Pα (%) 
1 1033  45  1033       
2 946  41  1892  858  91 81 
3 282  12  846  232  82 79 
4 41  2  164  28 68 67 
5 7  0  35 4  57 57 
6 1  0  6       
8 1  0  8       
>1 1278    2921  1122  88  80 
Total  2311  100  Different authors: 2103     
 
The authors’ dataset contains author specific variables for each of the 2,103 different 
authors of the 1,278 multi-authored articles (see Appendix Part B for the definitions, sources 
and descriptive statistics of these variables). Besides their name, gender, institute affiliation 
and geographical location, the ‘scientific age’ and ‘scientific weight’ of each author have been 
assessed. An author’s ‘scientific age’ has been calculated as the year 2002 minus the year of 
the first publication in a journal included in the SSCI. The median (mean) value is 13 (14.7) 
years. The variable ‘scientific weight’ denotes the number of articles the author has published 
since 1969. ‘Scientific weights’ vary from 1 to 175. The median (median) value is 14 (20) 
articles. The correlation between scientific weight and age is 66.8%.  
 
III.  EFFECT OF ALPHABETIC NAME RANK ON INDIVIDUAL OUTPUT 
We wish to measure whether having a name ranked earlier in the alphabet contributes to 
academic performance. To this end, we will estimate two performance measures and include 
the relative alphabetic rank of an author as a potential determinant. The two performance 
measures are: (1) an author’s total number of publications in refereed economics journals, i.e. 
“scientific weight” and (2) an author’s scientific output per year, i.e. “scientific weight” 
divided by “scientific age”.
8 We estimate the effect of the alphabetic position of an author’s 
last name on both performance measures, while controlling for potential productivity related 
factors such as gender, geographical location and whether the author works in or outside 
academia.




Two assumptions are made. First, authors don’t seek co-authors based on their name 
(occurring later or earlier in the alphabet than their own name). This assumption must on 
average be true since, in the case of two authors, one will always have a higher ranked name 
than the other. Second, the size of the author group is independent of the authors’ alphabetical 
positions. For instance, we assume that Z-authors do not prefer single authorship to joint 
authorship because that would guarantee being ‘first author’. The latter assumption has been 
investigated and could not be rejected (see Appendix Part C).  
Note that we look at the productivity effect of name position in the alphabet, instead of 
actual first authorships. The effect of actual first authorships (indeed the author with the 
lowest ranking letter in 88% of cases) would most probably be biased due to endogeneity, 
since a deliberate decision, probably based on productivity, is involved here. Alphabetic name 
rank can be considered a qualified and valid instrument of the probability that one is first 
author, given the alphabetic ordering convention. 
Suppose we would indeed find that scientific productivity is higher for individuals whose 
last names occur earlier in the alphabet. Could we then conclude that this productivity effect 
is the result of increased reputation and visibility? If so, we would expect this fact to arise 
late, but not early, in an economist’s career. Thinking about reputations and how they are 
formed, we can hardly expect differences in reputation (and thereby scientific output), caused 
by the effect of name ordering, amongst authors who have written zero or few articles before. 
None of them have had any chance to build a reputation and visibility, whether they are A or 
Z starters, since it takes time to build a reputation. Including these debutant authors in our 
sample therefore generates noise when measuring the effect of reputation (through name 
ordering). Therefore we consider two samples: (1) economists who have at least one 
publication in a top or middle class economics journal, and (2) economists who have at least 
15 publications in refereed economics journals, thereby being above median performers in our 
sample.
 10  For similar reasons, Einav and Yariv (2006) have even restricted their sample to 




Another way of testing if people who are likely to be first authors get differential credit when 
publishing more is to measure if the effect of scientific age on annual productivity is larger for 
economists whose names are in the beginning of the alphabet. If new publications are driven 
by first-authorships of previous papers, then A’s should see a faster growth than Z’s.
11 
Table 2, Panel A, shows the estimation results where the indicator for academic 
performance is scientific weight (column I) and annual scientific productivity (column II). 
 








































    

















Asia base  -1.30 










































N 2058  2058  2058  2058  2058  2058 
























    
Log(sc. age)          .64*** (.04) 
 
 
























































N 952  952  952  952  952  952 




The first two rows contain the key variable of interest, i.e. (log) “letter”. This variable is 
based on the cumulative distribution of first letters of authors in the multi-authored articles 
sample. For the i
th letter we define “letter” by  1
2 100.[ ( ( ) ( 1))] Fi Fi + − where F(.) stands for 
the empirical distribution function of the alphabetic frequency distribution. It ranges from 
3.76/2 for authors whose names start with an A to (98.43+100)/2 for authors whose names 
start with a Z. Thus, the variable indicates where one stands in the name distribution of 
economists. The first two columns (and rows) in the table show that there is no significant 
effect of alphabetic name rank, neither on scientific weight, nor on annual productivity. 
The effects of the control variables are notable. Not surprisingly, scientific age is a major 
determinant of publications: People who are one year further in their careers, have on average 
1.56 more publications (see also Maske et al., 2003). Scientific age is omitted as a control 
variable in the productivity equations because it is the denominator of the dependent variable. 
In line with Maske et al. (2003), females publish less, both in total and per year. They have on 




lower. The first two equations do not show any evidence that authors from the US are more 
productive than their European colleagues. Asian economists have an almost significantly 
lower annual production. Academic affiliation has the expected effect: People whose main 
affiliation is outside the university have a significantly lower scientific weight (-2.75) and 
annual productivity (-.23). 
The distribution of scientific weight has a few observations with very high values. 
Therefore, next to traditional OLS, we applied two common procedures to minimize the effect 
of outliers: median regressions (columns III and IV) and some log-transformations (columns 
V and VI).  
The effect of someone’s position in the alphabet remains unaffected and insignificant. Our 
preliminary conclusion still stands. The effects of the control variables are somewhat affected. 
We now see that US authors have more publications and are more productive per year than 
Europeans. Asian authors perform slightly worse. 
As was discussed, it may be the case that being an A-author or a Z-author will only start to 
affect scientific production after the first couple of publications (most likely as a first author 
for A-authors and as a last author for Z-authors). Therefore, the earlier analysis in Panel A is 
repeated for the group with a higher than median scientific weight only (cf. the restriction by 
Einav and Yariv to the top five or ten schools).
12  Panel B in Table 2 shows the results. If the 
letter rank were irrelevant to building a reputation, it would have no effect in this sub-sample 
either.  
Interestingly, columns III to VI, in which we account for the non-normal distribution of 
the dependent variables, all show a significantly negative effect of “letter” on scientific 
performance, indicating a reputation advantage of A-professors over Z-professors, resulting in 
an increased scientific output of 3.4 articles ((100+98.4)/2-3.76/2)*0.035) and an 0.16 
(97.3%*0.0017) articles higher annual productivity. Columns V and VI show that a one 
percent lower letter-ranked name increases both total and annual output by 3.3 percent points. 
The table shows furthermore that various determinants of scientific standing have ceased to 




economists. The only consistent determinants of scientific weight are ‘letter’ and ‘scientific 
age’; the unique determinant of annual productivity is ‘letter’.  
The result is consistent with Einav and Yariv (2006), who find a significant correlation 
between last name ranking and tenure at the top 5 and top 10 economics departments in the 
US, but the effect becomes insignificant when they extend their sample and include lower 
ranked economics departments (to 20 or top 35).
13 Hence, our findings are remarkably in line 
with these of Einav and Yariv: The relationship between name rank and productivity is only 
significant  given a sample of highly productive economists. One might think that we 
introduce a bias by selecting on the variable to be explained, as is the case when a wage 
equation estimated for workers is extrapolated to predict market wages for unemployed 
workers. However, given that we do not extrapolate our findings to a sample consisting of all 
authors, the prolific and the non-prolific ones, our estimated regression equation -valid for the 
sub-sample-, is not biased. 
The second test of the relevance of letter rank for academic productivity (growth) is 
assessing whether the effect of ‘scientific age’ on productivity is larger for lower letter-ranked 
names. This would imply that scientific productivity grows faster for A-authors than for Z-
authors, because A-authors have been more visible on previous publications and have 
therefore built more reputation that, in turn, increases productivity. Hence, regressions are run 
with (log) annual productivity as a dependent variable and all the independent variables 
included in Table 2, where we add a cross-term of the variables (log)letter and (log) scientific 
age (both demeaned) whose coefficient measures the effect of interest. In addition, we control 
for (log) scientific age; this is required to estimate the cross-effect consistently. Table 3 shows 
the results. In both specifications, the relevant coefficient has the expected sign, and is 
marginally significant, implying that the scientific productivity of lower letter-ranked 
economists grows faster when they get older than the scientific productivity of higher letter-
ranked economists. 
Given these results the obvious question is if there should not be a correction for the effect 




Panel B, indicate that a Z-author would deserve a 16% premium on his observed weight as 
compared to an A-author. This is a non-negligible correction.  
 
Table 3 Test if lower name-ranked authors see a faster growth in publications   




Letter (demeaned)  .0005 
(.0007) 
 
Log(letter) (demeaned)    .0172 
(.0151) 
Scientific age (demeaned) .0139*** 
(.0023) 
 
Log(sc. age) (demeaned)    .2483*** 
 
Letter*Scientific age (both demeaned) 
 




















































IV.  NAME ORDERING STRATEGIES BY AUTHOR GROUPS 
The effect of name ordering on individual productivity is sizeable. We have shown this by 
using a qualified and valid instrument of the likelihood of appearing as a first author on a 
paper, i.e. alphabetic name rank. Thus, the next question is: Do economists perceive name 
order selection for multi-authored papers as a deliberate choice? What are the characteristics 




Individual contributions to co-authorships are unobserved: Truthful statements on this 
delicate matter are difficult to collect. Therefore, we assume that the unequal distribution of 
contributions is a function of relevant observable aspects of inequality between authors of a 
specific article m. There are several relevant dimensions: inequality in scientific weight; 
inequality in scientific age; and finally inequality in affiliation, i.e. whether some (but not all) 
co-authors have a non-academic affiliation (often leading to severe time restrictions). 
We distinguish k aspects and denote those inequalities for article m by  1,..., mm k σ σ , 




mj m j S β σ =∑  
where the  's j β , to be estimated, represent the relative weights of the various inequality 
aspects. 
We assume that the choice for a non-alphabetic name ordering may be described by a 
hurdle model, that is, it is chosen if the overall- inequality between authors is too conspicuous 




mj m j S β σγ => ∑  
Otherwise, name ordering is alphabetic. 
It is conceivable that the level of the hurdle itself varies with group characteristics, other 
than the inequalities amongst authors captured in  1,..., mm k σ σ . For instance, a group of, on 
average, older and more settled authors might be more indifferent towards applying the merit 
strategy and therefore applies a higher hurdle γ. In short, we make γ  flexible and we rewrite 




mj m j i m i
ji
Sx βσ γ γ
==
=> − ∑∑  
where the xi stand for other group characteristics i, such as the average scientific weight and 




whose names all appear early in the alphabet may apply a higher hurdle than authors whose 
names appear, on average, later in the alphabet and who will have little chance in general to 
be a first author; inequality in alphabetical position, since the hurdle might be higher, the 
larger the difference in alphabetic positions is; nationality, as standing for differences in 
publication customs; and, gender. Moreover, the hurdle might depend on the extent to which a 
publication counts for someone’s academic merit. The vector x therefore also includes the 
impact factor of the journal and the number of pages of the article. Finally, the hurdle might 
differ between occasional author groups and longer-term combinations of authors. We would 
think that occasional groups of authors would rather follow the default strategy, whereas 
longer-term relations would alternate their names and therefore deviate from the alphabetic 
order more easily. Conflicts can be solved in a repeated game, by making promises (or 
threats) about name order in the next period.  
We rewrite the inequality above in the usual Probit-format such that the coefficients β and 
γ can be estimated, i.e., the determinants of non-alphabetic name ordering strategies. Since the 
difference between the observed behavior -P(AB)- and its underlying name ordering strategy -
pα- depends on the number of authors (see equation (2)), we estimate the resulting equation 
separately for the samples of two-authored and three-authored articles. We shall also estimate 
the equation for the entire sample of multi-authored papers and control for the number of 
authors. Since a larger number of authors leads to a lower probability of an unintended 
alphabetic name order, the likelihood of alphabetic name ordering is expected to decrease in 
the number of authors.  
The dependent dummy variable “name order” in this regression equals 1 when a group of 
authors deviates from alphabetic order, whereas it is zero when they order their names 
alphabetically. The exact definitions of the independent variables, i.e. the variables 
1,..., mm k σ σ  and the vector x, are provided in Part D of the Appendix. 
Table 4 shows the estimation results. For continuous variables they represent the marginal 




probability of observing a non-alphabetic outcome. For dummy variables the entries in the 
table denote the effect of changing the dummy value from zero to one.  Equations I to III 
show the results for the entire sample of multi-authored articles, while controlling for the 
number of authors. Due to the high correlation between scientific age and scientific weight, 
we present three sets of results, based on: (I) Inclusion of both (log) age and (log) weight 
characteristics, (II) Inclusion of (log) weight characteristics only, (III) Inclusion of (log) age 
characteristics only. The differences are minor. Equation IV re-estimates Equation I on the 
75% sub-sample of two-authored articles, whereas equation V does so for the 22% sub-
sample of three-authored articles.
14  
 
Table 4 Determinants of name ordering strategies of author groups 
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N  1233 1233 1233  923  276 

















In all specifications, at least one of the inequality variables significantly and positively affects 
the probability to observe a non-alphabetic name ordering, as was expected. Equation II 
shows that an increase in the standard deviation of the weights of the authors by one percent 
point increases the probability of observing a non-alphabetic ordering by 8%. Likewise, 
equation III shows that increasing the standard deviation of scientific age by one percent 
would increase the probability of observing a non-alphabetic ordering by 5%. These effects 
are significant and substantial.
15 Differences within author groups in terms of affiliations 
(academic versus non-academic) do not generate any significant effect. 
The hurdle turns out to be affected significantly by some of its potential determinants. 
Again, focusing on the second and third equations, we see that the average scientific age and 
weight of the author group both affect their decision to deviate from an alphabetic name order 
negatively.
16 As we expected, more experienced groups of authors with more publications are 
less inclined to deviate from the alphabetic name ordering convention. The table reveals that 
the choice of whether to include age and/or weight characteristics does hardly affect the 
remaining coefficients. The discussion of these estimates shall therefore be based on the first 
equation only. 
The effect of the average position of author names in the alphabet is significant and as 
expected: XY(Z)-authors apply lower hurdle rates and use a non-alphabetic name ordering 
more often than AB(C)-authors.  A larger standard deviation of the letter positions of the 
authors has a significantly negative effect on the use of a non-alphabetic name order: The 
closer the letters of the author group are to each other in the distribution of names, the higher 
the likelihood of observing a non-alphabetic ordering outcome.  
The impact figure of a journal has no effect on the usage of alphabetic name ordering. 
Whereas Joseph et al. (2005) find that the occurrence of alphabetic name ordering is higher in 
a set of three top journals than in a set of three second tier journals, we find no such effect 
using a more continuous measure of journal quality. However, the number of pages of the 




author's career, increase the probability of an alphabetic name ordering. A ten pages longer 
article than average has a three percent higher probability of alphabetic name ordering.
17  
For occasional author groups we do not observe different name ordering outcomes than for 
long-term author teams. This result is against our expectation that repeated author groups will 
deviate somewhat more easily from alphabetic name ordering. Finally, the effects of 
geographical location and the presence of a female in the author-group are statistically 
insignificant for the explanation of name order strategies. Moreover, as expected, the number 
of authors affects the probability of observing alphabetic name ordering negatively. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Several explicit factors are accounted for in the performance measurement systems used for 
academics. Other, more implicit, factors might also lead to better academic performance. 
Alphabetic name rank might very well be such an implicit factor.  
The first objective of this paper was to establish whether an economist’s academic 
performance is affected by alphabetic name rank, given the default alphabetic strategy. 
Indeed, we find significant effects of the alphabetic rank of an economist’s last name on 
scientific production, given that an author has already a certain visibility in academia. 
Another demonstration of this phenomenon is that the growth rate of an economist’s number 
of publications increases marginally faster over the years for economists whose names rank 
lower in the alphabet. Being an A author and thereby often the first author is beneficial for 
someone’s reputation and academic performance. Hence, name ordering is a strategic 
decision. 
The paper’s second aim was to evaluate if authors know that name ordering matters and 
consequently take ordering seriously. This turned out to be the case: Several characteristics of 
an author group composition determine the decision to deviate from the default alphabetic 
name order significantly. One group of such characteristics captures the effect of inequality of 
merits amongst authors in a group. Increased inequality increases the likelihood of using a 




determining whether to deviate from alphabetic name ordering depends on author group 
characteristics, such as the average scientific standing of the group and the distribution of 
their names in the alphabet. Name ordering turns out to be not random. 
Our findings suggest that there is room for a correction method where individual 
performance measures are corrected for the advantage or disadvantage of being situated in the 
vanguard or the rearguard of the alphabet, given the convention of alphabetic name ordering. 
An alternative way of terminating this practice leading to discrimination against Z authors is 
that journal editors take (random) name ordering decisions. And, the fact that they do should 
then be public information.   
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A. Journal and article selection 
The articles sample consists of all regular articles published in the period 1997-1999 in the 
following 11 journals: (1) American Economic Review; (2) Economica; (3) Economic 
Journal; (4) European Economic Review; (5) International Economic Review; (6) Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization; (7) Journal of Economic Perspectives; (8) Journal of 
Economic Theory; (9) Journal of Political Economy; (10) Quarterly Journal of Economics; 
and (11) Review of Economic Studies. 
These eleven journals have been selected for their general character, and their mix 
between European and American origin. Moreover, the selected set of journals includes both 
top and middle-class journals and they do not impose a specific (alphabetic) author ordering. 
Three years have been selected to obtain a large enough sample of multi-authored articles. 
Book reviews, notes, comments as well as papers and proceedings issues are excluded from 
the sample.  
The resulting articles database of 2,311 articles is selected from the digital database “Web 
of Science” (WOS). For each of the 1,278 multi-authored articles, the following 
characteristics are included in the database: (1) Title; (2) Author names; (3) Number of 
authors; (4) Journal name and its impact score
18; (5) Year and journal issue; (6) Number of 
pages; (7) Name ordering (alphabetic or not); (8) Number of previous joint publications (in 
any refereed journal) 
 
B. Author selection and author-related variables 
The authors’ dataset contains author-specific variables for each of the 2,103 different authors 
who have published the 1,278 articles in the articles database. The following author-specific 
variables are included: (1) Name; (2) Gender; (3) Type of institution of main base (university 




age’ (number of years since first publication in any journal with impact factor)
19; (6) 
‘Scientific weight’ (Number of publications in journals with an impact factor since 1969). 
The values of each of these author-specific variables have been calculated based on 
Econlit, which includes publications beginning in the year 1969.
20 An author’s gender was 
identified based on first names.
21   
89% of the authors are male. 90% of the authors are mainly affiliated with a university.
22 
For the geographical location of the institution that an author is affiliated with, we distinguish 
between the US, Europe, Asia and other. 57% of the authors are US-based, 33% Europe based 
and 4% Asia-based. The remaining 6% work elsewhere.
23  
An author’s scientific age has been calculated as the year 2002 minus the year of the first 
publication in a journal included in the SSCI (source: Econlit). Unfortunately, the “scientific 
age” variable had to be truncated at 33 since tracing back publications before 1969 was 
impossible. This may lead to an underestimate of the scientific age variable for a maximum of 
3.4% (72) of the authors in the sample, i.e. the authors who were active in 1969 already.
24  
 The variable “scientific weight” denotes the number of articles the author has published 
since 1969. The source Econlit, however, spells out the names of at maximum three authors 
and only mentions the name of the first author of articles written by more than three authors. 
Consequently, an author’s track record according to Econlit is the sum of the number of 
articles (s)he has written with one or two co-authors and the number of articles (s)he has 
written as first author with more than two co-authors. This leads to an under-estimate of the 
track record of authors who where not the first author in an author group larger than three. 
The majority of these authors will have last names starting with letters late in the alphabet, 
given the alphabetic convention, resulting in a positive association between a lower ranked 
last name and scientific weight. To circumvent such a bias, the “scientific weight” calculation 
includes articles with three authors or less and excludes all articles written by more than three 
authors.  
 





Table A Distribution of alphabetical ranking of author names 
  Authors with co-authors  Authors without co-authors 
Ranking Frequency % Cum.  perc. Frequency %C u m .   perc.
1=A 79 3.76 3.76 25 3.81 3.81
2=B 188 8.94 12.70 49 7.46 11.27
3=C 144 6.85 19.54 51 7.76 19.03
4=D 105 4.99 24.54 28 4.26 23.29
5=E 55 2.62 27.15 16 2.44 25.73
6=F 74 3.52 30.67 24 3.65 29.38
7=G 125 5.94 36.61 29 4.41 33.79
8=H 114 5.42 42.04 44 6.70 40.49
9=I 23 1.09 43.13 3 0.46 40.95
10=J 41 1.95 45.08 16 2.44 43.39
11=K 100 4.76 49.83 28 4.26 47.65
12=L 103 4.90 54.73 34 5.18 52.83
13=M 153 7.28 62.01 52 7.91 60.74
14=N 46 2.19 64.19 18 2.74 63.48
15=O 36 1.71 65.91 9 1.37 64.85
16=P 92 4.37 70.28 37 5.63 70.48
17=Q 4 0.19 70.47 2 0.30 70.78
18=R 100 4.76 75.23 29 4.41 75.19
19=S 238 11.32 86.54 63 9.59 84.78
20=T 68 3.23 89.78 21 3.20 87.98
21=U 9 0.43 90.20 0 0.00 87.98
22=V 54 2.57 92.77 20 3.04 91.02
23=W 102 4.85 97.62 32 4.87 95.89
24=X 3 0.14 97.77 3 0.46 96.35
25=Y 14 0.67 98.43 11 1.67 98.02
26=Z 33 1.57 100 13 1.98 100
Total 2103 100 657 100
 
Table A shows the distributions of author names (as characterized by their first letter) 
separately for articles with one author (second column) and more than one author (first 
column).  
The distributions are identical according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equal 
distributions: The test outcome is a corrected p-value of 0.990. Furthermore, according to 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, the distributions are equal (p-value = 0.81). Hence, 
authors whose names occur later in the alphabet are not less inclined to collaborate in joint 
authorships. This supports the assumption that the size of the authorship group is independent 
of an individual’s position in the alphabet.
25  
 
D. Definitions of the independent variables in the name ordering strategy equations 
The empirical proxies used for evaluating the inequality in academic standing across the 




logarithm of the standard deviation of scientific age. The log-transformation is chosen 
because of the expected decreasing marginal effect of more (years of) publications on the 
variable to be explained. Actually, every time the log of a standard deviation is taken, we 
calculate the log of the standard deviation plus one. Another inequality proxy included in the 
specification is a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one of the co-authors has a 
non-academic affiliation (whereas at least one of the remaining co-authors doesn’t).  
The average (log) scientific weight and age of the author group is used as proxies for their 
average scientific standing. The distribution of co-author names per author-group over the 
alphabet is characterized by means of the average and the standard deviation of the letter 
rank. The academic importance of articles is measured by the impact factor of the journal and 
the number of pages of the article.“One-shot author groups”, i.e. groups that have not 
previously collaborated (insofar as this has led to a publication), are distinguished from 
longer-term co-operations.
26 Finally, a dummy variable is included that is one whenever at 
least one of the co-authors is female and zero otherwise, and one that is 1 for groups of US-





                                                 
1* Corresponding author. C.m.vanpraag@uva.nl; Roetersstraat 11, 1018WB  Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands.  
2 The occurrence of multi-authored papers has increased rapidly over the last few decades. For 
instance, in two leading economics journals, i.e., Journal of Political Economy and American 
Economic Review, it has increased from six (JPE) and eight (AER) percent in 1950 to 40% and 55% in 
1993 (Hudson, 1996). Sutter and Kocher (2004) document this trend in a broader range of (high quality 
and lower quality) economics journals.  
3 The percentage varies over academic disciplines and is highest in economics (see Engers et al., 1999; 
Laband and Tollison, 2000). In the psychological literature, for instance, the percentage of 
alphabetically ordered articles is only forty percent.  
4 There are many seemingly irrelevant individual characteristics that may co-determine one’s success in 
life, for instance, beauty and height (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994) and first names (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2004). The alphabetic rank of last names might be another seemingly irrelevant factor 
correlated with success. 
5 Our analysis is restricted to a database gathered from the economics literature, since the dramatic 
difference between the neighboring disciplines of economics and psychology demonstrates that name 
ordering behavior is discipline-specific. Hence, our results cannot be generalized to other disciplines 
than economics (see also Laband, 2002). 
6 The differences in approaches to this first question and findings between Einav and Yariv (2006) and 
our study will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of the paper. 
7 This overall pα is calculated as the weighted average of the pα’s over all n. The observed alphabetic 
percentage is higher the fewer authors are involved: it is 91% for two authors and 57% for five authors. 
Moreover pα decreases as n increases: Two authors use an alphabetic strategy in 81% of cases, whereas 
this percentage decreases to 79% for three, to 67% for four, and to 57% for five authors. 
8 Einav and Yariv (2006) proxy productivity by tenure at highly ranked schools in the US, fellowships 
of the Econometric Society and Nobel Prize and Clark Medal winnings. 
9 We do not correct for the origin of the name of an author. For instance, if Chinese authors have names 




                                                                                                                                            
problem. However, the analysis by Einav and Yariv (2006), who did control for the origin of names, 
showed that this was not the case. 
10 Truncating the sample based on the dependent variable is econometrically admissible because we 
wish to predict the effect of alphabetic name position on one’s scientific weight for a population of 
economists with a higher than median number of publications. This practice can be compared to 
estimating wage equations for a sample of wage earners (excluding people without jobs). This type of 
selectivity is not worrisome as long as the equation has been estimated based on a representative 
sample of the total population one wishes to make predictions for.  
11 We are grateful to one of the anonymous referees who suggested this additional analysis. 
12 We also ran these regressions for the sub-sample of below median producers. These showed that 
someone’s alphabetic position is a non-significant determinant of total production and of productivity 
at the earlier stage of one’s career. This supports the assumption we made in the beginning that merit 
and alphabetic rank are uncorrelated. This set of regressions showed furthermore that the significant 
control variables in the entire sample are even more significant in the below median sample, indicating 
that they determine production and productivity primarily at earlier career stages. 
13 Einav and Yariv (2006) find no significant results for the other performance measures analyzed, 
namely fellowships of the Econometric Society and Clark Medal and Nobel Prize winners. 
14 The results from estimating equations II and III on the sub-samples of 2 and 3-authored articles are 
virtually the same as the results in columns IV and V.  
15 We checked whether the effects of an author group’s standard deviations in scientific weight and age 
on name-ordering are purely caused by, what we call a “PhD student-supervisor effect”: i.e., the habit 
of some supervisors to always position themselves first (or last) when collaborating with their PhD-
students. To this end, we dropped all observations from the sample that included one author with the 
lowest possible scientific weight and/or the lowest possible scientific weight (n=120) and reran the 
regressions. The estimation results on the sample excluding these novices were similar to the results in 
Table 4. We conclude that the relationship between an author group’s differences in scientific standing 
and the probability of using a merit strategy is caused by a more widely applied mechanism than only 
within the group of PhD-students with their supervisor. 
16 The averages and standard deviations of scientific weight and age are obviously correlated to each 




                                                                                                                                            
following a merit strategy of the standard deviations (both positive) and the averages (both negative). 
We reran the regressions twice to check whether this was the sole cause of our finding: once without 
averages and once without standard deviations. All results kept standing when only inserting averages 
or standard deviations of the weight and age variables.  
17 The number of pages in a journal has not been standardized according to differences in number of 
words per page across journals. 
18 The impact factor is based on the objective ranking, the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), 
annually published by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). The impact factor for each journal 
is calculated by using the following formula: impact factor year X = (Cites in year X to articles 
published in year X-1 and in year X-2)/(Number of articles published in year X-1 and in year X-2). We 
use X=1999. 
19 Preferably, an author’s ‘birth year’ would be defined by the year in which an author completed her 
PhD, but this was very difficult to obtain. 
20 The Web of Science database -used for the articles related variables- was unsuitable because it 
includes publications as of 1988 only.  
21 For 196 authors whose first names were not clearly identifiable as male or female (we had for 
instance difficulties with many of the Chinese and Japanese names or with Western names that are used 
for both males and females) we consulted their personal websites. These often give a clue about gender. 
We gathered the email addresses of authors without identifiable personal website and sent them a mail 
with our information request. In the end, the number of authors with unknown gender was 45. We 
dropped them from the sample for analysis. In an alternative specification, not reported in this paper, 
we labeled their gender as male and used an extra dummy indicating ‘gender unknown’. This 
alternative specification rendered the same results. 
22 If an author has changed affiliations over time, we counted the most recent affiliation, unless the 
author has worked in a different institution for the majority of the time period in which most of his/her 
publications have been produced. Whenever an author works for both types of institutions, we consider 
the institution that has been mentioned first (in the author affiliations footnote in the article) as his/her 




                                                                                                                                            
23 If an author has worked in several institutions over the relevant period and if these institutions are 
located in different geographical areas according to our definition, we have assigned both values to the 
geographical location variable.  
24 Of course, some authors might not have published in 1969, but did so in, for instance, 1968 and 
1970. Their scientific ages will be truncated as well. However, since the economists in our database 
publish more than one article per year on average in any of the journals included in the SSCI, this will 
not increase the proportion of truncated values by much. 
25 Einav and Yariv (2006) also find that the relationship between alphabetic name rank and the size of 
the author group is insignificant. They only find a small effect for the small fraction of articles with 
more than three authors. 
26 We acknowledge that we cannot distinguish between ‘one-shot games’ and ‘first periods’ of longer-
term co-operations.  
 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1884 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Corporate Tax Policy and International Mergers 
and Acquisitions – Is the Tax Exemption System Superior?, January 2007 
 
1885 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, The Effect of Benefits Level on Take-up Rates: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, January 2007 
 
1886 José García-Solanes, Francisco I. Sancho-Portero and Fernando Torrejón-Flores, 
Beyond the Salassa-Samuelson Effect in some New Member States of the European 
Union, January 2007 
 
1887 Peter Egger, Wolfgang Eggert and Hannes Winner, Saving Taxes Through Foreign 
Plant Ownership, January 2007 
 
1888 Timothy J. Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout, On the Optimal Design of Disaster 
Insurance in a Federation, January 2007 
 
1889 Wim Groot, Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink and Bernard van Praag, The 
Compensating Income Variation of Social Capital, January 2007 
 
1890 Bas Jacobs, Ruud A. de Mooij and Kees Folmer, Analyzing a Flat Income Tax in the 
Netherlands, January 2007 
 
1891 Hans Jarle Kind, Guttorm Schjelderup and Frank Stähler, Newspapers and Advertising: 
The Effects of Ad-Valorem Taxation under Duopoly, January 2007 
 
1892 Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka, Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing 
under Labour Market Imperfections, January 2007 
 
1893 Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, Herman de Jong and Marc 
Schramm, The Development of Cities in Italy 1300 – 1861, January 2007 
 
1894 Michel Beine, Oscar Bernal, Jean-Yves Gnabo and Christelle Lecourt, Intervention 
Policy of the BoJ: A Unified Approach, January 2007 
 
1895 Robert S. Chirinko and Daniel J. Wilson, State Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum 
Game?, January 2007 
 
1896 Theo S. Eicher and Oliver Roehn, Sources of the German Productivity Demise – 
Tracing the Effects of Industry-Level ICT Investment, January 2007 
 
1897 Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch and Tonny Lybek, Central Bank Boards around the World: 
Why does Membership Size Differ?, January 2007 
 
1898 Gabriel Felbermayr and Wilhelm Kohler, Does WTO Membership Make a Difference at 
the Extensive Margin of World Trade?, January 2007  
1899 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional 
Quality on the Shadow Economy, January 2007 
 
1900 Tomer Blumkin and Efraim Sadka, On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable 
Contributions, January 2007 
 
1901 Frederick van der Ploeg and Reinhilde Veugelers, Higher Education Reform and the 
Renewed Lisbon Strategy: Role of Member States and the European Commission, 
January 2007 
 
1902 John Lewis, Hitting and Hoping? Meeting the Exchange Rate and Inflation Criteria 
during a Period of Nominal Convergence, January 2007 
 
1903 Torben M. Andersen, The Scandinavian Model – Prospects and Challenges, January 
2007 
 
1904 Stephane Dees, Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Long Run 
Macroeconomic Relations in the Global Economy, January 2007 
 
1905 Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob De Haan, Political Regime Change, Economic Reform 
and Growth Accelerations, January 2007 
 
1906 Sascha O. Becker and Peter H. Egger, Endogenous Product versus Process Innovation 
and a Firm’s Propensity to Export, February 2007 
 
1907 Theo S. Eicher, Chris Papageorgiou and Oliver Roehn, Unraveling the Fortunates of the 
Fortunate: An Iterative Bayesian Model Averaging (IBMA) Approach, February 2007 
 
1908 Liliana E. Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak and Barbara S. Schone, Efficiency in Family 
Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and 
Disabled Elderly Parents, February 2007 
 
1909 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Self-Selection and Advice in Venture 
Capital Finance, February 2007 
 
1910 Rune Jansen Hagen and Gaute Torsvik, Irreversible Investments, Dynamic 
Inconsistency and Policy Convergence, February 2007 
 
1911 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, The Role of School Improvement in 
Economic Development, February 2007 
 
1912 Bernard M. S. van Praag, Perspectives from the Happiness Literature and the Role of 
New Instruments for Policy Analysis, February 2007 
 
1913 Volker Grossmann and Thomas M. Steger, Growth, Development, and Technological 
Change, February 2007 
 
1914 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Human Capital and the Feldstein-Horioka 
Puzzle, February 2007 
  
1915 Oliver Roehn, Theo S. Eicher and Thomas Strobel, The Ifo Industry Growth 
Accounting Database, February 2007 
 
1916 Ian Babetskii, Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States, 
February 2007 
 
1917 Burkhard Heer, Alfred Maussner and Paul D. McNelis, The Money-Age Distribution: 
Empirical Facts and Limited Monetary Models, February 2007 
 
1918 Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn and Eijii Fujii, The Overvaluation of Renminbi 
Undervaluation, February 2007 
 
1919 Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Ulrich Woitek, To React or Not? Fiscal 
Policy, Volatility and Welfare in the EU-3, February 2007 
 
1920 Mattias Polborn, Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision, February 
2007 
 
1921 Lars P. Feld and Benno Torgler, Tax Morale after the Reunification of Germany: 
Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, February 2007 
 
1922 Robert S. Chirinko and Huntley Schaller, Fundamentals, Misvaluation, and Investment: 
The Real Story, February 2007 
 
1923 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance 
and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis, February 2007 
 
1924 Adrian Pagan and M. Hashem Pesaran, On Econometric Analysis of Structural Systems 
with Permanent and Transitory Shocks and Exogenous Variables, February 2007 
 
1925 Hans-Werner Sinn, The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization, February 2007 
 
1926 Michael Smart, Raising Taxes through Equalization, February 2007 
 
1927 Øystein Foros, Kåre P. Hagen and Hans Jarle Kind, Price-Dependent Profit Sharing as 
an Escape from the Bertrand Paradox, February 2007 
 
1928 Balázs Égert, Kirsten Lommatzsch and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, Real Exchange Rates in 
Small Open OECD and Transition Economies: Comparing Apples with Oranges?, 
February 2007 
 
1929 Aleksander Berentsen and Cyril Monnet, Monetary Policy in a Channel System, 
February 2007 
 
1930 Wolfgang Ochel, The Free Movement of Inactive Citizens in the EU – A Challenge for 
the European Welfare State?, February 2007 
 
1931 James K. Hammitt and Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. Identified Lives in Benefit-Cost 
Analysis, February 2007 
  
1932 Wilhelm Kohler, The Bazaar Effect, Unbundling of Comparative Advantage, and 
Migration, February 2007 
 
1933 Karsten Staehr, Fiscal Policies and Business Cycles in an Enlarged Euro Area, February 
2007 
 
1934 Michele Bernasconi and Paola Profeta, Redistribution or Education? The Political 
Economy of the Social Race, March 2007 
 
1935 Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner and Lars-H. R. Siemers, Does Terror Threaten Human 
Rights? Evidence from Panel Data, March 2007 
 
1936 Naércio Aquino Menezes Filho and Marc-Andreas Muendler, Labor Reallocation in 
Response to Trade Reform, March 2007 
 
1937 Gebhard Flaig and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Does the Euro-zone Diverge? A Stress 
Indicator for Analyzing Trends and Cycles in Real GDP and Inflation, March 2007 
 
1938 Michael Funke and Michael Paetz, Environmental Policy Under Model Uncertainty: A 
Robust Optimal Control Approach, March 2007 
 
1939 Byeongchan Seong, Sung K. Ahn and Peter A. Zadrozny, Cointegration Analysis with 
Mixed-Frequency Data, March 2007 
 
1940 Monika Bütler and Michel André Maréchal, Framing Effects in Political Decision 
Making: Evidence from a Natural Voting Experiment, March 2007 
 
1941 Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne, A Theory of Tolerance, March 2007 
 
1942 Qing Hong and Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and 
Foreign Direct Investment, March 2007 
 
1943 Yin-Wong Cheung, Dickson Tam and Matthew S. Yiu, Does the Chinese Interest Rate 
Follow the US Interest Rate?, March 2007 
 
1944 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity 
Backfire?, March 2007 
 
1945 Burkhard Heer, On the Modeling of the Income Distribution Business Cycle Dynamics, 
March 2007 
 
1946 Christoph A. Schaltegger and Lars P. Feld, Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in 
Decentralized Governments?, March 2007 
 
1947 Giovanni Facchini, Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri Silva and Gerald Willmann, Substitutability 
and Protectionism: Latin America’s Trade Policy and Imports from China and India, 
March 2007 
 
1948 C. Mirjam van Praag and Bernard M. S. van Praag, The Benefits of Being Economics 
Professor A (and not Z), March 2007 